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NOTES
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT SEXUAL CONTACT: THE
BATTLE BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE MEDICAL
PROFESSION
Whatever houses I may visit, I will come for the benefit of the
sick, remaining free of all intentional injustice, of all mischief and
in particular of sexual relations with both female and male persons.
-Hippocratic Oath'
Throughout history, the medical profession has forbidden sexual contact
between medical practitioners and their patients.2 The Hippocratic Oath has
prohibited sexual contact between doctors and their patients since 460 B.C.3
Today, the medical profession continues explicitly to condemn sexual rela-
tions in physician-patient relationships.
4
1. See Maura L. Campbell, The Oath: An Investigation of the Injunction Prohibiting
Physician-Patient Sexual Relations, 32 PERSP. 1N BIOLOGY & MED. 300, 300 (1989) (setting
forth entire text of Hippocratic Oath); see also infra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing
Hippocratic Oath).
2. See GARY R. SCHOENER ET AL., PSYCHOTHERAPISTS' SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT WITH
CLIENTS: INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION 332-33 (1989) (describing historical development of
ethical prohibition).
3. See Hippocrates, Physician's Oath, in STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 579 (3d
lawyers' ed. 1972) ("In every house where I come I will enter only for the good of my
patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill-doing and all seduction, and especially
from the pleasures of love with women or with men."); 23 THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
889 (15th ed. 1990) (providing slightly different translation of Oath); see also Campbell, supra
note 1, at 304-07 (discussing reasons for inclusion in Hippocratic Oath of injunction against
sexual contact with patients and outlining continuing concern of Western medical authors for
this injunction). In Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1984), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that, although the Hippocratic Oath is not a
basis for liability, it is indicative of the medical profession's historic knowledge of and concern
about the potential for sexual abuse in the physician-patient relationship. Id. at 368 n.2.
4. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFAIms, AMERICAN MED. ASS'W, Opinion
8.14: Sexual Misconduct in the Practice of Medicine, in CURRENT OPnIoNs OF THE COUNCIL
ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 40, 40 (1992)
[hereinafter AMA CURRENT OPINIONS] (defining sexual misconduct as sexual contact that
occurs concurrent with physician-patient relationship). Opinion 8.14 states:
Sexual contact that occurs concurrent with the physician-patient relationship consti-
tutes sexual misconduct. Sexual or romantic interactions between physicians and
patients detract from the goals of the physician-patient relationship, may exploit the
vulnerability of the patient, may obscure the physician's objective judgment con-
cerning the patient's health care, and ultimately may be detrimental to the patient's
well-being.
If a physician has reason to believe that non-sexual contact with a patient may
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Despite the medical profession's clear proclamation, whether courts will
recognize the public's right to rely on physicians to execute faithfully their
ethical obligation to refrain from engaging in sexual activity with patients
depends on how much weight they place on the medical profession's ethical
standards. 5 Uncertainty results from a fundamental anomaly in the structure
of physician regulation. 6 The medical profession retains autonomy based on
its promises to self-regulate and rigorously apply its ethical standards to its
members. 7 However, when a physician's conduct falls below professional
standards, the primary avenues of redress available to a patient all involve
action by the state, which enforces its own standards rather than the medical
profession's standards. 8
This anomaly becomes especially apparent in medical licensing board
disciplinary actions. A primary justification for states' delegation of regu-
latory power to medical licensing boards is that the physicians sitting on
the boards presumably know the ethics of their profession better than the
be perceived as or may lead to sexual contact, then he or she should avoid the non-
sexual contact. At a minimum, a physician's ethical duties include terminating the
physician-patient relationship before initiating a dating, romantic, or sexual relation-
ship with a patient.
Sexual or romantic relationships between a physician and a former patient may
be unduly influenced by the previous physician-patient relationship. Sexual or ro-
mantic relationships with former patients are unethical if the physician uses or
exploits trust, knowledge, emotions or influence derived from the previous profes-
sional relationship.
Id.
See also AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE PRINCIPLEs OF MEDICAL ETHICs WITH AN-
NOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PsYCHIATRY § 2, at 4 (1993) (stating that sexual contact
with current or former patients is unethical); Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American
Medical Association, Sexual Misconduct in the Practice of Medicine, 266 JAMA 2741, 2745
(1991) [hereinafter AMA Report] (explaining rationale for conclusion that sexual contact or
romantic relationship concurrent with physician-patient relationship is unethical and that sexual
contact or romantic relationship with former patient may be unethical under certain circum-
stances); Brian McCormick, Canadians Vow "Zero Tolerance" for Sex Abuse by Doctors,
AM. MED. NEws, Aug. 10, 1992, at 6 (reporting Ontario College of Physicians and Surgeons'
independent task force recommendation of reforms, including adoption of policy that sexual
abuse of patients is never acceptable); Beverly Merz, House Just Says No to Sex Between
Doctors, Patients, AM. MED. NEws, Dec. 14, 1990, at 10 (describing American Medical
Association House of Delegates' adoption of report defining sexual contact within doctor-
patient relationship as breach of medical ethics).
5. See infra notes 6-13 and accompanying text (describing fundamental anomaly in
structure of physician regulation, which results in uncertainty regarding right to rely on
physicians to execute their ethical duties).
6. See infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (discussing abnormality in structure of
physician regulation that allows medical profession autonomy in exchange for promise to self-
regulate according to its strict ethical standards but provides only state avenues of redress for
misconduct).
7. See infra notes 48-59 and accompanying text (discussing justifications for medical
profession's autonomy).
8. See infra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing avenues of redress available to
patients).
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rest of the public and can identify conduct that renders a physician unfit
to practice medicine. 9 However, despite the states' recognition that the
medical profession possesses the greatest ability to evaluate the conduct of
physicians, the medical boards are bodies created by state governments, and
as such they must confine their activities to investigations of violations of
the laws promulgated by the state legislatures rather than violations of
standards promulgated by the medical profession.' 0 Therefore, breaches of
professional ethical standards that the state legislature has not codified
remain outside of the jurisdiction of the licensing board. In short, states
give medical licensing boards the power to discipline physicians because the
boards know the ethics and standards of the medical profession, yet the
states do not give the medical boards the power to apply those very same
ethics and standards.
This fundamental anomaly reveals that professional medical ethics are
in competition and conflict with law as embodied in the pronouncements
of courts and legislatures." With regard to physician-patient sexual contact,
the states have, in some instances, maintained a vision of what constitutes
disqualifying unethical conduct that is quite different from the medical
profession's view.' 2 The medical profession and the states are embroiled in
an ongoing struggle over normative space, 3 and this struggle causes public
uncertainty over the standards to which physicians must adhere. The public
has received mixed messages regarding what constitutes unethical conduct
and whether a firm basis exists for relying on the pronouncements of the
medical profession on this subject.
9. See Coe v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Colo., 676 F.2d 411, 414 (10th
Cir. 1982) (stating that state board of medical examiners is presumed to know better than
laymen ethics of medical profession and what renders one unfit to engage in practice of
medicine).
10. See ROBERT M. DERBYSHIRE, MEDICAL LICENSURE AND DIscIPLINE IN THE UNITED
STATES 76 (1969) (describing medical boards as state entities); see also Pons v. Ohio State
Med. Bd., 614 N.E.2d 748, 753 (Ohio 1993) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (explaining that, although
state grants medical board power to discipline physicians because board is more able than
courts to determine what constitutes acceptable medical practice, board's disciplinary action
based on violation of professional ethical standards is unlawful because beyond statutory
constraints).
11. See infra notes 80-111 and accompanying text (describing conflict between medical
profession and state regarding proper standards of physician conduct).
12. Compare supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (describing medical profession's
absolute prohibition of physician-patient sexual contact) with infra notes 88-111 and accom-
panying text (describing diverse manners in which states handle issue of physician-patient
sexual contact).
13. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv.
1389, 1392 n.13 (1992) (defining use of term "normative"). For the purposes of this Note,
the terms "normative" and "norm" describe an ideal standard of conduct or ethical rule
binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and
acceptable behavior. WEBSTER'S TmR NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1540 (1986). A norm is a principle of right action. Id. Thus, a struggle over
normative space is a struggle over the ability to assert or deny that something ought to be
done or has value in a particular arena or for a particular group.
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Some courts have noted the inherent contradiction in telling the public,
on the one hand, that the ethical obligations of physicians require the
physicians to refrain from having sex with patients, and, on the other hand,
telling the public that patients have no right to rely on physicians to execute
those ethical obligations faithfully.' 4 However, despite this contradiction,
other courts and legislatures continue to send this mixed message to the
public. 
5
Courts evaluating medical licensing board disciplinary actions based on
physician-patient sexual contact increasingly have considered what impor-
tance to place on the medical profession's code of ethics, the fiduciary
nature of the physician-patient relationship, and the power dynamics within
the professional relationship that deprive the patient of the ability to give
true consent to sexual contact with the physician. 6 This Note considers
issues involved with, and the balance among, the public's and individual
14. See Petrillo v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 960 (Il1. App. Ct. 1986) (stating
that it would be contrary to common sense for public to be told that physicians have ethical
obligation to obtain patient's consent before disclosing patient's medical confidences but that
patient has no right to rely on physician's faithful execution of ethical obligations), appeal
denied, 505 N.E.2d 361 (Ill.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987); see also Yates v. EI-Deiry,
513 N.E.2d 519, 522 (Il. App. Ct. 1987) (citing Petrillo for proposition that public policy is
reflected in medical profession's code of ethics, which consists of Hippocratic Oath, AMA
Principles of Medical Ethics, and Current Opinions of Judicial Council of AMA), appeal
denied, 520 N.E.2d 394 (I1. 1988); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 684 P.2d 581, 587 (Or.
Ct. App. 1984) (stating that civil right of recovery against physician for breach of ethical
duties is created by public's right to rely on widespread public knowledge of ethical requirements
of medical profession), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985).
15. See infra notes 88-111, 123-91 and accompanying text (discussing diverse manner in
which legislatures and courts handle issue of physician-patient sexual contact). The media and
the entertainment industry exacerbate the mixed messages received by the public. Sexual
relationships between physicians, especially psychiatrists, and their patients form the standard
plot line fof a variety of popular films, such as Tim PRaNCE oF TIDEs (Columbia Pictures
1991) and BAsIc INSTINCT (TriStar 1992). See Melinda Beck et al., Sex and Psychotherapy,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 13, 1992, at 53 (describing examples of psychiatrist-patient sexual contact in
history and in popular films). To the film industry's credit, the psychiatrist played by Richard
Gere in FINAL ANALYSIS (Warner Bros. 1992) checked the Code of Ethics before entering into
a sexual relationship with a patient's sister to ensure that such conduct was not unethical.
Syndicated advice columns further reflect indications of the public's perception of the prohi-
bition against physician-patient sexual contact. See Ann Landers, Barbara Noel's Ordeal Stirs
Intense Reaction, Cin. TRIB., Oct. 11, 1992, Tempo, at 3 (publishing letters from public and
responses regarding issue of physician-patient sexual contact). Landers' widely-read column
included letters to the public from the medical profession, including representatives of the
American Psychiatric Association, Southern California Psychoanalytic Institute, and the Men-
inger Clinic. Id. The communications from the medical profession informed the public that
the profession universally prohibited sexual contact within the physician-patient relationship.
Id. Unfortunately, other syndicated columnists understate the serious implications of physician-
patient sexual contact. See JUDITH MARTIN, MISS MANNERS' GUDE FOR THE TuRN'-oF-THm-
MILLENNiUm 540 (1989) (advising optometrist, who was concerned about propriety of soliciting
romantic dates from female patients, about proper method of propositioning patients).
16. See infra notes 123-91 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts either
recognized or rejected medical profession's code of ethics, fiduciary nature of profession, and
power disparity as relevant factors).
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patient's rights, the medical profession's autonomy, the states' dominion
over the medical field, the judiciary's application of professional ethics
codes in board disciplinary actions, and the judiciary's recognition of the
power imbalance within the physician-patient relationship.
Part I of this Note discusses the problem of sexual contact between
physicians and patients and why the medical profession prohibits such
contact. Part II examines the ability of both the state and the medical
profession to govern physician conduct. Part III considers the relationship
between law and medical ethics-the medical profession's normative vision
and how it contrasts, competes, and coexists with state law governing
physicians. Part IV discusses the current judicial application of the medical
profession's code of ethics, specifically the provision prohibiting physician-
patient sexual contact, and examines how the judiciary handles the issues
of fiduciary duty and power dynamics in the professional fiduciary rela-
tionship. Part V contrasts courts' application of the medical code of ethics
in actions involving confidentiality issues with how courts apply the medical
code of ethics in matters involving sexual contact issues. This contrast
illustrates that courts are allowing the public to rely on the medical profes-
sion's ethical standards in some circumstances, but not in others. Finally,
this Note concludes that courts and legislatures should make greater use of
the medical profession's ethical code to define standards of conduct and
public policy regarding physician-patient sexual contact. Judicial indifference
towards the medical profession's prohibition of physician-patient sexual
contact denies the public its "benefit of the bargain" in granting occupa-
tional autonomy to the medical profession.
7
I. THE PROBLEM WITH SEXUAL CONTACT BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND
PATIENTS
The term "sexual misconduct" often triggers debate over the precise
type of sexual activity that rises to the level of "misconduct."'" Sexual
contact that occurs as a result of the physician's exertion of physical force
over the patient or that occurs under the "guise of treatment" has been
widely discussed and is universally condemned. 19 However, "consensual"
sexual contact between physicians and patients of unequal power status has
been addressed less adequately.20 This Note focuses on the latter type of
17. See infra notes 48-59 (discussing bargain between medical profession and society in
which medical profession gains autonomy in exchange for promise to regulate itself).
18. See SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 1 (Ann W. Burgess
& Carol R. Hartman eds., 1986) (observing that term "sexual misconduct" triggers debate
over precise type of sexual activity that constitutes misconduct).
19. See id. (commenting that sexual victimizations in which one person exerts force over
another person have been well documented in crime statistics, national surveys, and studies).
In addition, courts and legislatures universally condemn rape by physicians and sexual contact
that the physician achieves under the "guise of treatment," without the patient's knowledge
or consent. See Atienza v. Taub, 239 Cal. Rptr. 454, 456 (Ct. App. 1987) (discussing cases in
which courts condemned sexual contact achieved under "guise of treatment").
20. See Burgess & Hartman, supra note 18, at 1 (commenting that sexual victimizations
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sexual exploitation, in which a physician in an authority position takes
advantage of the patient's relative powerlessness.
The attitudes of both society and the law toward intervention into the
private lives of individuals has changed substantially over time. In early
American society, courts scrutinized sexual and marital practices . 21 Today,
courts ordinarily consider an adult's decision to enter into a sexual rela-
tionship with another consenting adult to be a privacy interest outside the
scope of legal intervention. 22 The right to privacy, however, is not absolute,
characterized by one person exerting dominance over person of unequal power status have
been less adequately addressed than other types of sexual victimization). Burgess and Hartman
remark that most of the clinical literature on the subject deals primarily with either incest or
child sexual abuse. Id. Both incest and child sexual abuse involve child-adult sexual activity,
which is already proscribed by federal and state statutes. Id. Sexual activity between adults in
disparate power positions has received considerably less attention. Despite the gravity of the
issue, researchers have encountered a great deal of resistance to the investigation and study of
sexual misconduct by physicians. See generally Nanette K. Gartrell et al., Institutional Resistance
to Self-Study: A Case Report, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS nY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS,
supra note 18, at 121-23 (describing American Psychiatric Association's resistance to internal
committee's investigation of sexual abuse of patients by psychiatrists). Of the reasons offered
for the lack of investigation of physicians' sexual misconduct, concern for the reputation of
the medical profession is perhaps the most problematic. See id. at 123 (stating that American
Psychiatric Association resisted internal study because some members were "concerned that
the survey data could damage the public image of psychiatry"); S. Michael Plaut & Barbara
H. Foster, Roles of the Health Professional in Cases Involving Sexual Exploitation of Patients,
in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, supra note 18, at 5, 6 (stating
that reluctance to discuss or investigate sexual misconduct in depth results, in part, from fear
that open discussion will damage reputation of profession). Resisting self-study out of fear
for the reputation of the medical profession is untenable because the profession's reputation
and autonomy are based on the profession's promise to regulate and discipline itself. See
supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text (explaining that medical profession attained esteem
and autonomy by promise to public to self-regulate).
21. See Eduardo Cruz, Comment, When the Shepherd Preys on the Flock: Clergy Sexual
Exploitation and the Search for Solutions, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 499, 499 (1991) (describing
early American scrutiny of sexual and marital practices and prevalence of "amatory actions"
during that time period). Cruz explains, "The trend toward elimination of amatory actions is
directly linked to changes in society, including increasing societal interest in personal choice,
decriminalization of sexual activities in many states, and growing skepticism about the law's
role in protecting feelings and in enforcing personal morality." Id. at 499-500 (citing DAN
DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 930 (5th ed. 1984)).
22. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (interpreting right to privacy as
granting individuals, married or single, right to make fundamentally private decisions free
from unwarranted governmental intervention); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84
(1965) (commenting on freedom of association element of right to privacy); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (stating that one aspect of "liberty" protected by Due
Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment is right to certain zones of privacy); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing that zone of personal privacy exists under Constitution);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (stating that right to be free from government
intrusions into private life is fundamental right). See generally Jeffrey A. Barker, Comment,
Professional-Client Sex: Is Criminal Liability an Appropriate Means of Enforcing Professional
Responsibility.7, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1275 (1993) (analyzing sexual privacy cases and discussing
constitutional implications of limiting sexual privacy right in context of professional-client sex).
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and the government retains the power to limit privacy rights in some
instances.23
One of the situations warranting government intervention is the contro-
versial area of sexual activity between physicians and patients.2A The medical
profession, by trying to apply its ethical standards through state licensing
boards, tacitly takes the position that such sexual activity is a matter for
state intervention. State legislatures that either adopt the American Medical
Association (AMA) standards by statute or adopt their own standards on
such sexual activity necessarily make this activity a matter for state inter-
vention. The courts, however, are in conflict.
The medical profession has consistently taken the position that physi-
cian-patient sexual relations warrant special consideration for two reasons.
First, the physician-patient relationship is fiduciary in nature, and a sexual
relationship violates the physician's fiduciary duties. Physicians serve as
medical trustees of their patients' lives and health; the special responsibility
accorded to physicians by virtue of their unique healing skills and the need
for patients to be able to trust in physicians' dedication to patient welfare
result in a prohibition against physician-patient sexual contact. 25 Second,
23. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 686 (noting that sufficiently compelling state interest will
validate regulation that burdens right of privacy); Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (stating that compelling
state interest may limit right of privacy); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
2791, 2824 (1992) (stating that exercise of constitutional rights within context of practicing
profession is subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by state); Cruz, supra note 21, at
500 (citing cases for proposition that laissez-faire attitude toward most sexual relationships
between adults does not mean that government is powerless to intervene in certain situations);
John M. O'Connell, Note, Keeping Sex Out of the Attorney-Client Relationship: A Proposed
Rule, 92 CoLum. L. REv. 887, 919 (1992) (stating that government can limit right to privacy
only if legislative enactments are narrowly drawn to express only legitimate state interests at
stake). In discussing a proposed rule prohibiting attorney-client sexual contact, O'Connell
observes that the privacy argument against such a rule might be that attorney-client sexual
activity is "consensual activity of the kind protected in the line of cases that has defined the
right to privacy, and that no compelling state interest can be advanced to justify proscribing
the autonomy of two adults who want to enter into a sexual relationship." Id.
24. See Barker, supra note 22, at 1335 (stating that state has compelling interest in
preventing professional-client sexual relationships if they are inherently harmful). Barker,
however, believes that harmless professional-client sexual relationships do not justify govern-
mental intervention. Id. Barker concedes that in particular contexts, such as the therapist-
patient relationship, the risk of harm is so high that empirical evidence could stand in the
place of actual proof of harm to a particular patient. Id. However, with other professions,
such as general medical practitioners and lawyers, it is impossible to read inherent harm into
the professional-client sexual relationship. Id. at 1335-36. Barker concludes that a blanket
prohibition based solely upon professional status would fall a strict scrutiny test and that
professionals should not be penalized by having to accept a significant, state-imposed burden
upon their rights to choose sexual partners. Id.
25. See NoRmAN S. BLAcKci & CnAuRzs S. BAILEY, LIABILIr m MEDICAL PRACTICE:
A REFERENCE FOR PunsicN~s 52 (1990) (discussing fiduciary nature of physician-patient
relationship). The medical profession recognizes that a "fiduciary" is one who holds something
in trust for another; thus, in the patient-physician relationship, the physician acts as the
medical trustee of the patient and the patient's life and health. Id. In setting forth its absolute
prohibition of physician-patient sexual contact, the AMA explained the special responsibility
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according to some, patient consent is not possible.26 The medical profession
has concluded that the risk of coercion is so high that true and authentic
consent on the part of the patient in this iype of relationship is usually
lacking.
27
The disproportionate distribution of power within the physician-patient
relationship deprives the patient of the ability to give meaningful consent
to a sexual relationship with the physician. 2 Despite the medical profession's
attempts to promote patient autonomy and eliminate medical paternalism,29
accorded to physicians by virtue of their unique skills of healing and the need for patients to
be able to trust the physician's dedication to the patient's welfare. See AMA Report, supra
note 4, at 2743 (discussing trust integral to physician-patient relationship and society's need
for physicians to use their knowledge, expertise, and influence solely for welfare of patients).
See also Carl Sherman, Behind Closed Doors: Therapist-client Sex, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
May 1993, at 64 (describing fiduciary nature of professional relationships in which client places
trust in professional and professional is sworn to act in client's best interests). Sherman
compares professional-client sexual relationships to incest due to the power imbalance and
trust between the parties, and he states that it can have the same effects such as guilt, shame,
anger, and despair. Id.
26. See AMA Report, supra note 4, at 2742 (explaining why patients cannot give true
consent to sexual contact with physician). The AMA Report provides:
When a physician acts in a way that is not to the patient's benefit, the relative
position of the patient within the professional relationship is such that it is difficult
for the patient to give meaningful consent to such behavior, including sexual contact
or sexual relations. It is the lack of reliable or true consent on the part of the
patient that has led researchers to compare physician-patient sexual contact with
other sexually exploitative situations such as sexual assault and incest. It is noteworthy
that several states specify that consent of the patient or client cannot be used as a
defense to charges of sexual misconduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
27. See id. (discussing lack of true or reliable consent on part of patient in physician-
patient sexual relationship).
28. See infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text (discussing power dynamics of profes-
sional relationship that render patient unable to give meaningful consent to sexual relationship);
see also AMA Report, supra note 4, at 2742 (discussing power dynamics as factor in physician-
patient sexual contact). The AMA Report provides:
[I]nstances of sexual contact with patients do seem to occur most commonly where
there is considerable disparity in power, status, and emotional vulnerability between
physician and patient. Physicians who engage in sexual contact with patients are
typically older and male, while patients are typically younger and female. Studies
among psychiatrists indicate that approximately 85% to 90% of sexual contact
involves a male psychiatrist and a female patient .... [Platients who were involved
in sexual contact with their psychiatrists were also the ones most likely to be
particularly vulnerable emotionally . - . [and] were more likely than other patients
to consider exploitative relations with an authority figure to be normal.
Id.
See also Nanette Gartrell et al., Psychiatrist-Patient Sexual Contact: Results of a National
Survey, I: Prevalence, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1126, 1128 (1986) (reporting that studies among
psychiatrists indicate that approximately 88% of sexual contact involves male psychiatrist and
female patient and that majority admitted that sexual contact with patient was for their own
emotional or sexual gratification). See generally PETER RUTTER, SEx IN Tm FORBIDDEN ZONE
(1989) (discussing why people in positions of power betray trust of patients and clients and
contemplating relationship between power and exploitation).
29. See ROBERT M. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 158-62 (1981) (discussing
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society continues to accord high status to physicians as the omnipotent
interpreters of medical truth and knowledge,30 and individual patients often
unquestioningly submit to the physician's authority."1 Physicians wield three
types of power.sz First, physicians possess the power of superior knowledge
by virtue of their medical training."3 Second, they have charismatic power
based on their own personal qualities.3 4 Third, and most importantly,
physicians command great social and cultural power, arising in part from
an implied contract between the medical profession and society which
entrusts the profession with the authority to determine medical truth and
knowledge." The three inextricably intertwined types of power work together
paternalism and patient autonomy in medical ethics); HOWARD BRODY, THE HEALER'S POWER
44-55 (1992) (same).
30. See BRODY, supra note 29, at 17-18 (1992) (describing how society accords high
status to those it entrusts to define medical truth and knowledge).
31. See id. at 15 (stating that people who are under particular stress or threat will seek
safety in authority). Brody explains that most people, when well, are fully capable of assuming
freedom and responsibility; but these same people, when sick, can be comforted only through
subjugation to miracle, mystery and authority. Id. A fictitious Chief of Medicine described
by Brody explains physician-patient power dynamics:
The millions fear sickness and death and want the doctor to abolish those fears....
They have no confidence in their own wisdom, their own resources, to pull them
through. They look to the doctor to have all the power, to make all the choices, to
be free to act for them .... [R]eligion and medicine issue ultimately from the same
source. Do you really think that we have advanced that much beyond primitive
society, in which priest, soothsayer, and medicine man were all embodied in the
same person? Can you look at recent examples of contagious epidemic diseases in
our society-the society that thought it had outgrown epidemics and contagion-
and seriously say that we are not ready to burn witches at the stake, to sacrifice
victims to appease the gods, once the fear is upon us?... [Both medicine and
religion] try to address the most profound fears of humanity, and ultimately there
are two ways to do this-through meaning and magic.... [I]n times of great need
and fear, the millions do not want meaning; they want magic, and the more potent
the better .... And so we who would accept the priesthood of healing the sick must
have our magic too. The magic comes in three forms-miracle, mystery, and
authority.... [When patients] think they stare death in the face or think their wives
or children or parents do, they want miracles, and they want doctors who look and
talk like people who perform miracles.
Id. at 4-7. Cf. ROBERT ZUSSMAN, INTENSIVE CARE: MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE MEDICAL
PROFESSION 2 (1992) (criticizing some medical ethicists for ignoring nonrational matters that
account for patients' willingness to give consent to medical procedures, including imbalance
of influence between patients and doctors and social forces that shape patients' values).
32. See BRODY, supra note 29, at 16-18 (discussing three types of power that physicians
possess: Aesculapian/knowledge power, charismatic power, and social/cultural power); cf.
O'Connell, supra note 23, at 889 (discussing two types of power, societal and relational, that
lawyers possess).
33. See BRODY, supra note 29, at 16 (describing power of knowledge, or "Aesculapian
power," as arising from knowledge of obscure and complex body of facts and theories, as
well as from practical skills).
34. See id. at 16-17 (describing physicians' charismatic power as personal qualities,
including courage, decisiveness, firmness, and kindness).
35. See id. at 17 (stating that physicians' social and cultural power arises from status
that society accords them and explaining "implied contract" between medical profession and
society).
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and enhance each other. 36 However, many of the concerns about potential
power abuse in physician-patient relationships arise primarily from physi-
cians' social power and the other social roles physicians play in our society,
which can clearly be separated from their roles as healers.37 As a consequence
of these acquired and endowed powers, physicians necessarily stand in a
position of power in relation to their patients, who have entered into a
fiduciary and trusting relationship with their physicians."8
Prior to 1990, the AMA recognized the potential for power abuse in
physician-patient relationships and declared "sexual misconduct" in the
practice of medicine to be unethical.3 9 However, after criticism that this
prohibition against sexual misconduct did not define "misconduct" and
merely begged the question, in 1990 the AMA amended its Code of Medical
Ethics to clarify what type of sexual conduct is proscribed. 4 0 Today the
Code expressly provides that sexual contact that occurs concurrently with
the physician-patient relationship constitutes sexual misconduct. 4' Sexual
relationships that predate the physician-patient relationship, such as sexual
contact with a spouse, are an exception to this general rule.42 In most other
36. See id. at 32 (stating that it is impossible to separate charismatic and social power
from power of knowledge).
37. See id. at 31 (stating that problem of power abuse arises from multitude of social
roles physicians play that are distinguishable from their roles as healers).
38. See O'Connell, supra note 23, at 889 (stating that power imbalance is inevitable
consequence of entering into fiduciary or confidential relationship); see also Nanette K. Gartrell
et al., Physician-Patient Sexual Contact, W.J. MED., Aug. 1992, at 139, 142 (describing power
imbalance that results when patient enters into fiduciary relationship with physician).
39. See Telephone Interview with David Orentlicher, Office of General Counsel, American
Medical Association (Feb. 16, 1993) (describing pre-1990 opinion declaring "sexual misconduct"
to be unethical).
40. See id. (stating that questions regarding specific conduct that constituted "miscon-
duct" prompted AMA to clarify that all physician-patient sexual contact concurrent with
professional relationship constituted "misconduct");. see also AMA CURRENT OPINIONS, supra
note 4, at 40 (setting forth current version of Opinion 8.14).
41. See AMA CURRENT OPINIONs, supra note 4, at 40 (prohibiting all sexual contact
that occurs concurrently with physician-patient relationship).
42. See Gartrell et al., supra note 38, at 139 (excluding from definition of "physician-
patient sexual contact" spouses, significant others, and sexual partners who later became
patients). Providing an exception for sexual relationships that predate the professional rela-
tionship is sensible in light of the rationale supporting the AMA's rule prohibiting physician-
patient sexual contact. Physician-patient sexual contact is prohibited because the patient's
consent to the sexual relationship may be affected by the patient's emotional or psychological
vulnerability resulting from the professional relationship. See AMA Report, supra note 4, at
2742 (discussing reasons for prohibition against physician-patient sexual contact). If the sexual
relationship predates the professional relationship, the patient's consent to sexual contact with
the physician obviously was not affected by the professional relationship because the profes-
sional relationship did not exist at the time consent was given. Therefore, sexual relationships
with spouses, significant others, or sexual partners who later became patients fall outside of
the prohibition against physician-patient sexual contact concurrent with the professional rela-
tionship. However, even in these exceptional situations, the physician should keep in mind the
professional obligation to serve the needs of the patient. The emotional factors that accompany
sexual involvement may affect the physician's medical judgment, thus jeopardizing the patient's
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cases, the AMA has explained that sexual contact between a physician and
patient is almost always detrimental to the patient 3 and is unethical because
the physician's self-interest inappropriately becomes part of the professional
relationship." Because a fiduciary relationship exists between a patient and
physician, 45 physicians have a fiduciary obligation to act solely for the
welfare of patients by refraining from engaging in sexual activity with
patients.4 In the view of the medical profession, patients must be able to
rely on physicians' faithful execution of their ethical and fiduciary obliga-
tions in order for the physician-patient relationship to succeed. 47 In sum,
because physician-patient sexual contact has great potential to harm the
patient and because patients cannot give true consent, almost all physician-
patient sexual contact is per se sexual exploitation and sexual misconduct.
Although the AMA forcefully maintains that physician-patient sexual rela-
tionships are ethically impermissible, whether a physician who enters such
a relationship can be subject to discipline, and whether a patient can rely
on the medical profession's ethical position, are a matter of a complex
interplay between the power of the state to regulate medicine and the status
of medical practice as a profession.
II. Tim POWER OF THE STATE AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION TO GovERN
PHYSICIANS' CONDUCT
A. The Power of the Medical Profession to Regulate Itself
The medical profession, like other professions, has assumed a dominant
position in our society, and its members are part of the occupational elite
who have a unique opportunity to achieve prestige, influence, and wealth.4
diagnosis or treatment. Id. at 2743. One study concluded that although treating intimates for
major medical problems is not unethical, it is unwise because it is difficult for physicians to
be objective when they are emotionally involved. See Gartrell et al., supra note 38, at 143
(discussing finding that many respondents to study indicated that they had treated their spouses,
significant others, and former sexual partners).
43. See Gartrell et al., supra note 38, at 142-43 (setting forth detrimental effects of
physician-patient sexual contact and discussing serious harm to patients caused by sexual
contact with physicians); AMA Report, supra note 4, at 2742 (stating that most researchers
agree that effects of physician-patient sexual contact are almost universally negative or damaging
to patient).
44. See AMA Report, supra note 4, at 2743 (explaining that physician's professional
obligation to serve needs of patient and disregard own gratification means sexual contact with
patient is unethical).'
45. See id. (describing fiduciary responsibility and trust that are integral to physician-
patient relationship).
46. See id. (stating that health of individuals and society depends on physicians' willing-
ness to employ their knowledge, expertise, and influence solely for welfare of patients, and
that sexual contact with patient seriously compromises patient's welfare).
47. See id. (stating that patients who seek medical treatment must be able to trust in
physician's dedication to patient's welfare in order for physician-patient alliance to succeed).
48. See Criton A. Constantinides, Note, Professional Ethics Codes in- Court: Redefining
the Social Contract Between the Public and the Professions, 25 GA. L. REv. 1327, 1327 (1991)
(describing professionals' unique position of favor in society).
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One of the most crucial characteristics of any profession is the degree of
autonomy its members are able to maintain over their work. 49 A profession's
freedom from externally imposed standards, regulations or influence implies
that it is a responsible, self-contained body capable of and willing to regulate
itself.50 The medical profession's primary justification for self-regulation is
that, by nature, medical professionals operate from a distinct and esoteric
body of knowledge that the lay public is incapable of evaluatingA' Only
individuals who have mastered that specialized body of knowledge are
capable of accurately evaluating the performance of other medical profes-
sionals.12 As a result, the medical profession has emerged as an autonomous,
self-regulating body that, despite not being entirely free of state control,
remains formally free to control the content of its own work.53
The AMA's Code of Ethics, which outlines the medical profession's
obligations to the public, is the primary means by which the medical
profession broadcasts its image to the public in an effort to justify its
regulatory autonomy.54 The medical profession promises to monitor its
49. See id. at 1333 (citing James R. Elkins, Ethics: Professionalism, Craft, and Failure,
73 Ky. L.J. 937, 941-42 (1984-85) for proposition that autonomy is profession's crucial
characteristic); see also ELIOT FRELDsoN, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 77 (1970) (listing formal
criteria of profession cited by analysts); PAUL STARR, THE SOCsI TRANSFORmATiON OF AMER-
ICAN MEDICINE 15 (1982) (defining "profession" as "occupation that regulates itself through
systematic, required training and collegial discipline; that has a base in technical, specialized
knowledge; and that has a service rather than profit orientation, enshrined in its code of
ethics"). Freidson identifies two "core characteristics" of professions, a "prolonged specialized
training in a body of abstract knowledge, and a collectivity or service orientation." FREisoN,
supra, at 77 (citing William J. Goode, Encroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging
Profession: Psychology, Sociology, and Medicine, 25 Am. Soc. REv. 902-14 (1960)). In addition,
there are "derived characteristics" that result from the core characteristics: The profession
determines its own standards of education and training; professional practice is often legally
recognized by some form of licensure; licensing and admission boards are manned by members
of the profession; most legislation concerned with the profession is shaped by that profession;
and the practitioner is relatively free of lay evaluation and control. Id.
50. See Constantinides, supra note 48, at 1333 (stating that freedom from external
standards implies self-contained body capable of regulating itself).
51. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 41 (2d ed. 1991) (describing medical
profession's justification for control over licensing, discipline, and health care delivery).
52. See Constantinides, supra note 48, at 1334-35 (citing Arlene K. Daniels, How Free
Should Professions Be?, in THE PROFESSIONS AND THEI PROSPECTS 39, 40 (Eliot Freidson ed.,
1973) for proposition that only professional's peers are qualified to evaluate professional
performance); see also Richard Leahy, Comment, Rational Health Policy and the Legal
Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L.
RE. 1483, 1510-13 (1989) (arguing that medical societies are best suited to promulgate practice
guidelines to which courts should give legal force).
. 53. See FRImsoN, supra note 49, at xx (stating that medical profession has achieved
special status, autonomy, and control over own Work even when not free of state control).
See generally id. (analyzing how practice of medicine gained special status of profession).
54. See Constantinides, supra note 49, at 1372 (discussing professions' use of codes of
ethics to justify autonomy); see also MICHAEL MORAN & BRUCE WooD, STATES, REGULATION
AND THE MEDICAL PRO'ESSION 58-59 (1993) (describing AMA's claim to be "the voice of
American medicine").
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members to insure a high standard of medical care in exchange for the
right to be free from external intervention. 5  In return, the public delegates
regulatory power to the medical profession.16 Because the perceptions that
the medical profession transmits to society through its Code of Ethics induce
public acceptance of the medical profession's demand for autonomy, 7 the
public should have the right to rely on the members of the medical profession
to execute faithfully their ethical obligations.5" Allowing the medical pro-
fession autonomy to determine its own ethical standards while denying the
public the right to rely on physicians' adherence to their ethical code denies
the public the benefit of its bargain.5 9
The medical profession receives much criticism for failing to police its
members adequately.60 Although part of this perceived failure may be
attributed to physicians' reluctance to discipline "one of their own, ' 6 a
more problematic reason for the medical profession's failure to discipline
itself may be that the structure of the disciplinary system deprives the
medical profession of the ability to police its members sufficiently. 62 The
contradictory structure of the medical disciplinary system, in which the
public relies on physicians sitting on state medical boards to uphold their
ethical standards but in which the boards can uphold only state standards,
necessarily deprives the public the benefit of its bargain. Although the public
55. See Constantinides, supra note 49, at 1340-41 (describing profession's promise to
self-regulate in "social contract" between public and professions); see also MoRAN & WOOD,
supra note 54, at 24-25 (stating that self-enforcement of rigorous standards of ethics and
competence is hallmark of profession and that status of profession gives professionals oppor-
tunity to control their occupation).
56. See Constantinides, supra note 49, at 1340-41 (describing public's delegation of power
to-state according to "social contract" between public and professions); see also MoRAN &
WOOD, supra note 54, at 2 (stating that recognition by public of professional status is reflected
in expectation that doctors will be members of professional organization that has ethical code,
disciplinary rules, and control of entry and training standards).
57. See Constantinides, supra note 49, at 1371-72 (stating that public accepts medical
profession's demand for autonomy based on code of ethics).
58. See infra notes 59 and accompanying text (describing rationale for argument that
public has right to rely on physicians to execute their ethical duties).
59. See Constantinides, supra note 49, at 1371 (arguing that public loses "benefit of its
bargain" if courts do not acknowledge professional ethics codes in establishing duties or
standards of care).
60. See AMA Report, supra note 4, at 2744 (stating that commentators have expressed
concern that disciplinary bodies have not been sufficiently effective in dealing with sexual
misconduct).
61. See MarylinoBeck & Lori Long, Gynecologist-Patient Sexual Abuse: L A Medical
Board's View, in SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF PATIENTS BY HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, supra note
18, at 66, 66 (stating that one reason for delay in official board action is that medical colleagues
will not confront offender). Beck and Long state that other reasons for official delay are that
victims are reluctant to lodge complaints, avenues of complaint are lacking or unknown,
physicians tend to disbelieve such complaints, and identifiable forums or guidelines for dealing
with the issue have not been established. Id.
62. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing structure of disciplinary
system and available remedies as causes for medical profession's perceived failure to discipline
physicians).
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grants the medical profession autonomy based on the profession's promise
that its members will adhere to the professional ethical code, the public can
look only to the state for a remedy when physicians behave unethically.
The discovery and investigation of sexual misconduct is unlikely unless
victims of sexual misconduct initiate actions and pursue adequate state
remedies. 63 Victims of sexual abuse by physicians have four primary avenues
of redress, which all rely on the state's power to discipline physicians:
criminal complaints, common-law civil actions, statutory civil actions, and
professional board complaints." This Note will focus on the last of these
remedies, discipline by state medical boards.
B. The States' Power to Regulate Medical Practice
The state's power to regulate health care originates in the police power,
which the individual states retain according to the United States Constitu-
tion. 65 The state, however, only became involved in the regulation of
medicine in the 1880s at the request of the medical profession, which was
unable to prevent untrained practitioners from competing with trained
physicians." Thus, the medical profession attained its dominant position by
acquiring power and authority from the state.6
7
Since the state began licensing the practice of medicine, courts consis-
tently have held that states have a legitimate interest in regulating the
practice of medicine and maintaining the quality of medical care provided
within their borders.6" The United States Supreme Court has long recognized
63. See AMA Report, supra note 4, at 2744 (citing Nanette Gartrell et al., Reporting
Practices of Psychiatrists Who Knew of Sexual Misconduct by Colleagues, 57 AM. J. ORTo-
PSYCInATRY 287 (1987), and discussing avenues of detection and reporting of sexual misconduct
by physicians).
64. See generally Linda Jorgenson et al., The Furor Over Psychotherapist-Patient Sexual
Contact: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 645, 666-728 (1991)
(discussing remedies available to both direct and secondary victims of abuse).
65. See Fusuow, supra note 51, at 78 (discussing source of states' power to regulate
medicine).
66. See STARR, supra note 49, at 102 (1982) (describing medical profession's attempts to
win licensing laws to protect against untrained practitioners). See generally id. (describing rise
of medical authority and shaping of medical system).
67. See FaamsoN, supra note 49, at 23 (1970) (describing state's aid in establishing
profession's preeminence); MoRAN & WOOD, supra note 54, at 26 (stating that modem
professions accomplish dominant position by acquiring power and authority from state).
68. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827 (1975) (noting that state has
legitimate interest in maintaining quality of medical care provided within borders); Barsky v.
Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451 (1954) (holding that state has plenary power to regulate
practice of medicine and maintain professional standards, which power includes discretion to
suspend license on basis of criminal conviction in foreign jurisdiction); Lambert v. Yellowley,
272 U.S. 581, 598 (1926) (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (noting power to restrict physicians
belongs exclusively to states); Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925) (recognizing that
direct control of medical practice in states is beyond power of federal government); Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (observing that power of state to provide for welfare
of people authorized it to prescribe all medical regulations).
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that the state has the right to regulate generally in order to protect the
health and welfare of its people. 69 The Court also has recognized that the
nature and extent of mandatory physicians' qualifications depended pri-
marily upon the judgment of each state as to the necessity of such quali-
fications.70 The Court has maintained that there is perhaps no other profession
more properly open to state regulation than the medical profession.7' Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court has refrained from interfering with the states'
regulation of the field of medicine.
7 2
The states, through their courts, legislatures, state medical boards, and
prosecutors, involve themselves with almost every aspect of complaints
against physicians, no matter what avenues of redress patients choose. 73
Despite the civil and criminal remedies available and the high degree of
physician policing efforts by other groups, 74 physician discipline remains
primarily the responsibility of the state medical boards. 7 As grantors of
medical licenses, the boards are the only entities empowered by states to
sanction doctors, restrict their ability to practice, or revoke their medical
licenses.7 6 States, because they have exercised their power to regulate med-
icine through the medical boards, have a duty to protect the public; states
carry out this duty by putting the public in a position to make informed
choices among physicians. 77 Some commentators posit that, through licens-
69. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 263 F.2d 661, 666 (5th
Cir.) (per curiam) (citing Dent, 129 U.S. at 121-22), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959).
70. See Dent, 129 U.S. at 121-22 (stating that each state determines medical regulations
based on necessity for such regulations in that state).
71. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910).
72. See England, 263 F.2d at 668 (discussing Supreme Court's reluctance to interfere
with states' regulation of medical field).
73. See Jorgenson, supra note 64, at 666-728. (discussing remedies available to patients).
The courts, state legislatures, state medical boards, and prosecutors are all state entities or
agents, so the state is necessarily involved in any remedy.
74. See James Gray, Why Bad Doctors Aren't Kicked Out of Medicine, MED. ECON.,
Jan. 20, 1992, at 126, 128-40 (describing uncoordinated, ineffective efforts of hospital peer
review committees, Medicare PROs, various impaired-physician rehabilitation programs, federal
Drug Enforcement Administration, and informal colleague and partnership review).
75. Id. at 128.
76. Id.
77. See Eatough v. Albano, 673 F.2d 671, 676 (3d Cir.) (discussing states' interest in
allowing public to make informed decisions about physicians), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1119
(1982); see also Geiger v. Jenkins, 316 F. Supp. 370, 373 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (stating that state
may regulate practice of medicine in order to.perform its duty to safeguard public health),
aff'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971); Aitchison v. Maryland, 105 A.2d 495, 498 (Md.) (stating that
state, in performance of its duty to protect public health, can regulate practice of medicine),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 880 (1954). Geiger and Aitchison refer to the states' "duty" in the
medical field. However, most opinions refer to the states' "right" or "power" to regulate
health care. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (describing courts' recognition of
states' right to regulate practice of medicine). The fact that the states have the right to govern
the medical field does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the states have a duty to
take any particular action. Cf. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1992)
(observing that, in matters reserved for states, federal government can encourage, but cannot
compel, states to take particular actions).
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ing, state medical boards create legitimate expectations by the public that
licensees will behave ethically. 7 However, due to inconsistencies in the
states' actions, the public does not know what kind of behavior to expect,
and physicians do not know what behavior warrants penalties.7 9
III. Ti COMPLEX RELATION BETWEEN THE STATE'S LAW AND MEDICAL
ETmIcs AND ITS CoNFusING RESULTS
As traditionally and perhaps incorrectly conceived, the domain of any
kind of professional ethics begins where state law leaves off. According to
this understanding, ethics addresses only obligations above and beyond the
requirements of law.80 The traditional understanding suggests that a consen-
sus exists on the authoritative position of state law where state law exists.8'
However, these traditional assumptions about the relationship between
law and medical ethics conceal the competition and the dynamic interplay
between the states' and the medical profession's norms. The medical pro-
fession asserts that, in light of its unique expertise and esoteric knowledge,
substantial areas of the medical field should be reserved for the profession
to govern with its own rules.12 The state itself has sanctioned the profession's
autonomy by deferring to the profession on matters of physician regulation.83
Physicians control entry into the medical profession, disciplinary actions
against their colleagues, and the delivery of medical care.4 However, this
control results from the states' allocation of these functions to the medical
78. See Mary Ellen Waithe & David T. Ozar, The Ethics of Teaching Ethics, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1990, at 17, 21 (stating that boards' licensing of physicians allows
public to expect that physicians will behave ethically); see also BLACKMAN & BAILEY, supra
note 25, at 50 (1990) (noting that legal standards of medical care are based on reasonable
expectations of patients, and these in turn are based on code of ethics that physicians have
set for themselves).
79. See infra notes 98-191 and accompanying text (describing inconsistencies among states
regarding legal standards to which physicians must adhere).
80. See Koniak, supra note 13, at 1395 (describing traditional understanding of relation-
ship between law and professional ethics).
81. Id. at 1398.
82. See FREiDSON, supra note 49, at 45 (observing that medical profession bases its claim
for autonomy on possession of skill so esoteric and complex that nonmembers of profession
cannot evaluate it); MoRN & WooD, supra note 54, at 30 (stating that medical profession's
control over field is due, in part, to its role as custodian of medical knowledge).
83. See FRamsoiN, supra note 49, at 33 (stating that, although stati has ultimate authority
in matters of licensing and prosecution of physicians, the state has given much of its authority
to AMA resulting in medical profession's control over quality and terms of medical practice);
VEATCH, supra note 29, at 103 (explaining that in most states "professional misconduct" is
violation of state licensing laws, but that definition of professional misconduct is often made
by profession itself). Veatch offers Maryland as an example of a state that has ceded to a
private professional organization not only the definition of the standards governing grounds
for suspension of the publicly granted license, but also the authority to judge whether those
standards have been violated. Id.
84. See FutrRow, supra note 51, at 41 (describing physician's control over licensing,
discipline, and delivery of care within medical profession).
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profession." Although the states have allocated these areas to the medical
profession to govern, the profession must govern with the state's statutes
rather than with its own ethical standards.
Therefore, the traditional assumptions about the relationship between
law and medical ethics minimize the interplay between the two. The medical
profession is inextricably connected to the state and its laws-the profession
is dependent on the state for much of its power, but the state must defer
to the medical profession's expertise and rely on the profession to carry
out its normative vision. Problems arise at critical points where the medical
profession's normative vision diverges from the state's. The matter of
consensual intercourse between physicians and patients concurrent with the
"professional relationship has emerged as a critical point of disagreement.
The medical profession has declared its view of the issue in its ethical rules.
Under the traditional understanding, one hurdle for the medical pro-
fession is that the state treats rules of ethics as "law" only to the extent
that the ethical rules are incorporated into the state statutes.s6 Therefore,
the state relegates medical ethics to a relatively low status.87 However, to
allow the public the benefit of its bargain, the state needs to accommodate
the medical profession's alternative vision of law, which is expressed through
AMA ethical standards.
The state treats the medical profession's standards inconsistently, from
full recognition in some state statutes to total rejection by some courts. The
inconsistency arises from the fact that the state is not monolithic. Several
elements of the state, particularly the state legislatures and courts, may be
working at cross purposes. Moreover, a third element, the medical boards,
straddles the line between the state and the medical profession because it is
both part of the state and made up of members of the medical profession.
This inconsistent treatment of the medical profession's standards is
manifested in several ways. First, although most state legislatures have
codified some sort of legal prohibition against physician-patient sexual
relationships,"' the types of physician-patient sexual activity that individual
state statutes proscribe differ markedly. 9 Second, the sixty-three 9° state
85. See MORAN & WOOD, supra note 54, at 26 (observing that professionalism is form
of state-sanctioned regulation and that profession's control over itself is established by state).
86. See Koniak, supra note 13, at 1411 (stating that state treats ethics rules as "law"
only to extent and form in which state adopts those rules).
87. See id. (observing that in state's "hierarchy of norms" professional ethics occupy
relatively low status).
88. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-405.5 (West 1992) (stating that sexual
contact with patient is sexual assault in certain circumstances); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331
(West 1992) (stating that physician-patient sexual activity is unprofessional conduct in certain
circumstances); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344 (West 1992) (defining criminal sexual conduct in
third degree as including various types of physician-patient sexual contact); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANm. § 36-4-30 (1992) (stating that physician-patient sexual activity is unprofessional
conduct in certain circumstances); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.22(2) (Supp. 1992) (stating that
sexual contact with patient is felony regardless of consent).
89. See infra notes 98-109 and accompanying text (describing different types of conduct
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medical boards in the United States are as diverse as the states they serve.91
The Federation of State Medical Boards has asserted that both the level of
sanctions and the aggressiveness with which state medical boards pursue
sexual misconduct cases vary widely. 92 Third, the courts, both in reviewing
board disciplinary actions and in hearing private claims by patients, ap-
proach the issue of physician-patient sexual contact in widely different
manners. 93 Critics have expressed concern that existing disciplinary bodies
have not dealt effectively with physician sexual misconduct; 94 however, these
proscribed by state statutes); cf. Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So. 2d 858, 859 (Fla. 1984) (noting
that if professional ethical standards are not codified by state legislature, courts have no
jurisdiction over violation of such standards and violation can be addressed only by profession
itself).
90. See Gray, supra note 74, at 126, 128 (stating that some states have separate osteopathic
and allopathic boards).
91. See id. at 146 (commenting on disparate performances and lack of uniformity of
state medical boards despite lack of evidence that physician competence or impairment varies
from state to state at all).
92. See McCormick, supra note 4, at 6 (stating Federation of State Medical Boards'
assertion that level of sanctions and aggressiveness with which state medical boards pursue
sexual abuse cases vary widely); Tim Friend, Urging Tougher Pursuit of Bad Doctors, USA
TODAY, Jan. 13, 1993, at ID (stating that, according to 1993 report by Public Citizen Health
Research Group, state medical boards vary widely in their aggressiveness in disciplining
physicians and that people who live in states with "better boards" are better protected).
The 1993 report titled "Comparing State Medical Boards" by Public Citizen Health
Research Group, a Ralph Nader-founded consumer watchdog group based in Washington,
D.C., concluded that state medical boards still do too little to discipline negligent or incompetent
physicians. Elizabeth Neus, Incompetent, Negligent Docs Still Escape Punishment, GANNETr
NEws SERVICE, Jan. 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library. The group especially chastised
the boards for disciplining fewer than one percent of the nation's physicians. Id. However,
the report itself has received a great deal of criticism for relying solely on the number of
physicians disciplined as an accurate indicator of the effectiveness of the boards. See id.
(quoting Dr. James Winn, executive vice-president of Federation of State Medical Boards, as
stating, "Public Citizen continues to focus on a numbers game. They still say that the number
of scalps shows the effectiveness of the board.").
93. See infra notes 123-91 and accompanying text (examining different approaches courts
take when deciding physician sexual abuse issues).
94. AMA Report, supra note 4, at 2744; see Gartrell et al., supra note 63, at 293 (finding
that, as result of inadequate disciplinary actions, psychiatrists are avoiding censure by ethics
committees for sexual exploitation of patients).
Critics of the disciplinary boards cite rising complaints about physicians, a rate of
disciplinary actions that is not keeping pace with the number of complaints, and a lack of
uniformity in those disciplinary actions that do occur. See Gray, supra note 74, at 126
(describing inadequacy of physician policing effort).
Some commentators suggest that if state medical boards do not sufficiently improve their
systems of physician discipline, their jobs should be delegated to a federal agency. See Gray,
supra note 74, at 146 (suggesting that federal agency might perform physician discipline more
efficiently than state medical boards). However, in light of the states' traditional power to
regulate the medical field, a federal agency would probably not take over the boards' duties
of disciplining physicians.
The federal government, through its role as a purchaser of medical care, exercises some
degree of control over health care. See FURROW, supra note 51, at 87 (discussing purchasing
power as source of federal government's authority to control medical field). As a purchaser
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critics have identified only the medical boards' role in physician discipline
without recognizing that other actors, such as courts and legislatures,
contribute to the problem.
Each state has the right and power to impose conditions on the right
to practice medicine and may revoke a license for good cause.95 The
legislatures of each state delegate the power to regulate the medical profes-
sion to medical licensing boards. The legislatures delegate their power to
the boards because they presume that the boards, in light of their superior
knowledge of professional standards, can better evaluate and discipline
physicians' conduct.96 However, this delegation of regulatory power is
limited; the state sets the standards, and professionals merely apply them.
Despite the states' recognition of the medical profession's expertise in
evaluating physicians' conduct, the medical boards are state entities that
must confine their activities to investigations of violations of the laws
promulgated by the state legislatures rather than those promulgated by the
medical profession itself.97
The standards of conduct promulgated by the state legislatures vary.
Some states, such as Oregon, incorporate the medical profession's standards
into the state statutes so that the legal standard corresponds with the
professional standard. Oregon's statutes provide that the medical board may
discipline a physician for "unprofessional or dishonorable conduct." 98 More
importantly, the Oregon statutes include in the definition of "unprofessional
or dishonorable conduct" any conduct contrary to recognized standards of
ethics of the medical profession. 99 The Oregon Court of Appeals has held
of medical care, the federal government regulates the medical field through provider certifi-
cation. Id. In order to receive Medicare or Medicaid payments, an institutional provider must
be certified and must sign a provider agreement. Id. Although the federal government wields
considerable power to control health care in light of the immense sums it spends on medical
care, the federal government usually defers to the states. Id. at 88.
95. Coe v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Colo., 676 F.2d 411, 414 (10th
Cir. 1982).
96. See id. (stating that state board of medical examiners is presumed to know better
than laymen ethics of medical profession and what renders one unfit to engage or continue in
practice of medicine).
97. See DERBYsnmE, supra note 10, at 76 (describing medical boards as state entities).
98. See OR. Rv. STAT. § 677.190 (1991) (providing that "[t]he Board of Medical
Examiners for the State of Oregon may refuse to grant, or may suspend or revoke a license
to practice issued under this chapter for any of the following reasons: (1) Unprofessional or
dishonorable conduct .
99. See OR. REv. STAT. § 677.188(4) (1991) (including violation of professional ethical
standard in definition of "unprofessional or dishonorable conduct"). Section 677.188(4)
provides:
"Unprofessional or dishonorable conduct" means conduct unbecoming a person
licensed to practice medicine or podiatry, or detrimental to the best interests of the
public, and includes: (a) Any conduct or practice contrary to recognized standards
of ethics of the medical or podiatric profession or any conduct or practice which
does or might constitute a danger to the health or safety of a patient or the public
or any conduct, practice or condition which does or might impair a physician's or
podiatrist's ability safely and skillfully to practice medicine or podiatry ....
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that these statutory provisions incorporate ethical standards recognized by
the medical profession.'m°
Utah,' 01 North Carolina,0 2 Ohio, 03 and Wyoming" 4 include language
similar to the provision in Oregon's statutes that allows the state medical
100. See McKay v. Board of Medical Examiners, 788 P.2d 476, 479 (Or. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that legislature intended to incorporate by reference ethical standards recognized by
organized medicine). In McKay, the Oregon Court of Appeals responded to a physician's
contention that the medical board could find a violation of ethical standards only after
rulemaking defining "unprofessional conduct." Id. at 478. After reviewing the statutes and
the legislative history, the court decided that the statutory framework did not mandate
rulemaking before the medical board could find that a physician violated ethical standards.
Id. at 479. The board, therefore, was-not required to define "recognized standards of ethics"
by rulemaking, and could rely on the medical profession's standards. Id.
The McKay court's opinion is especially interesting in light of its background. Prior to
amendment in 1975, the Oregon statute did not include the language incorporating the medical
profession's standards into the definition of unprofessional conduct. In 1980, the Supreme
Court of Oregon in Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners refused to interpret
the old statute as incorporating external professional standards by reference because so doing
would create needless difficulties and bring up the question of the medical profession's authority
to impose rules to be enforced by governmental power. Megdal v. Oregon State Board of
Dental Examiners, 605 P.2d 273, 280 (Or. 1980). The Megdal court found that the medical
profession's views, like any other entity's views, might raise interesting issues of policy and
values. Id. at 281. However, the medical board should not look to the medical profession in
order to determine professional standards. Id. at 280. In 1981, the Oregon Court of Appeals,
in Spray v. Board of Medical Examiners, relied on Megdal for the proposition that "'ethical
standards' may be unlike 'professional standards' and might have to be established by
rulemaking." Spray v. Board of Medical Examiners, 624 P.2d 125, 125 (Or. Ct. App.),
modified, 627 P.2d 25 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 631 P.2d 341 (Or. 1981). Although the
amendment incorporating the medical profession's ethical standards became effective in 1975,
both the Megdal and Spray courts applied the pre-amendment version of the statute.
101. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-36(15) (1990) (defining "unprofessional conduct" to
include violation of medical profession's ethical standards). Section 58-12-36(15) provides:
"Unprofessional conduct" as relating to the practice of medicine includes . . any
conduct or practice contrary to the recognized standards of ethics of the medical
profession, or any conduct or practice which does or might constitute a danger to
the health, welfare, or safety of the patient or the public, or any conduct, practice,
or condition which does or might impair the license holder's ability to practice
medicine safely and skillfully ....
Id.
102. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(a)(6) (1990) (providing that medical board can discipline
physician for unprofessional conduct, including violation of medical profession's ethical stan-
dards). Section 90-14(a) provides:
The Board shall have the power to deny, annul, suspend, or revoke a license, or
other authority to practice medicine in [North Carolina], issued by the Board to any
person who has been found by the Board to have committed . .. [u]nprofessional
conduct, including, but not limited to, any departure from, or the failure to conform
to, the standards of acceptable and prevailing medical practice, or the ethics of the
medical profession, irrespective of whether or not a patient is injured thereby, or
the committing of any act contrary to honesty, justice, or good morals, whether the
same is committed in the course of practice or otherwise, and whether committed
within or without North Carolina ....
Id.
The District Court for the Western District of North Carolina held that the language of
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boards to look to, and to incorporate, the medical profession's ethical
standards when licensing and disciplining physicians. 05 These types of
statutes avoid the disparity between the professional standard that the public
expects to be upheld and the legal standard applied by the state boards.
Several other states, however, have articulated substantially different
standards of conduct that do not expressly incorporate the medical profes-
sion's standards. Most state statutes provide that "unprofessional conduct"
provides grounds for physician discipline.1l 6 However, states differ in how
they define "unprofessional conduct." Some states use a "reasonable phy-
sician" standard.' 7 Some states specifically address physician-patient sexual
§ 90-14(a)(6) itself and in conjunction with established medical ethics sufficiently informs
physicians of the standards by which they are to conduct themselves and their practice. Hoke
v. Board of Medical Examiners, 395 F. Supp. 357, 362 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
103. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(18)(a) (Baldwin Supp. 1991) (providing that
state medical board can discipline physician for violation of medical profession's code of
ethics). Section 4731.22(B) provides:
The board ... shall, to the extent permitted by law, limit, revoke, or suspend a
certificate, refuse to register or refuse to reinstate an applicant, or reprimand or
place on probation the holder of a certificate for . . . [t]he violation of any provision
of a code of ethics of a national professional organization. "National professional
organization" means the American medical association, the American osteopathic
association, the American podiatric medical association, and such other national
professional organizations as are determined, by rule, by the state medical board....
Id. § 4731.22(B).
104. See Wyo. STAT. § 33-26-402(a)(xxvi)(A)(I) (1977) (providing that medical board can
discipline physician for unprofessional conduct, including violation of medical profession's
ethical standards). Section 33-26-402(a) provides:
The board may refuse to grant or renew, revoke, suspend or restrict a license or
take other disciplinary action on the following grounds: ...
(xxvi) Unprofessional or dishonorable conduct not otherwise specified in this
subsection, including but not limited to:
(A) Any conduct or practice:
(I) Contrary to recognized standards of ethics of the medical profession;
(II) Which does or may constitute a substantial risk of:
(1) Danger to the health or safety of a patient or the public; or
(2) Impairing a physician's ability to safely and skillfully practice medi-
cine....
Id. § 33-26-402(a).
In addition, Wyoming also specifically provides that the medical board can discipline a
physician for "sexual exploitation of a patient." Id. § 33-26-402(a)(vii).
105. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text (describing language in Oregon, Utah,
North Carolina, Ohio and Wyoming statutes that incorporates medical profession's ethical
standards as legal standards of conduct).
106. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 08.64.326(a)(9) (1962 & Supp. 1992) (providing that state
medical board can impose disciplinary sanction on physician for engaging in "unprofessional
conduct ... in connection with the delivery of professional services to patients"); CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 2220 (West 1990) (prohibiting unprofessional conduct); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 334.100(2)(4) (1989 & Supp. 1992) (providing that state medical board may discipline physician
for "misconduct, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty, unethical conduct or unprofessional
conduct . . .").
107. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(6) (Baldwin Supp. 1991) (providing that
state medical board can discipline physician for "departure from, or the failure to conform
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contact. 08 Other states allow discipline for acts of moral turpitude, dishon-
esty, or corruption. °9 Although the same statutes do not specifically include
violation of a professional ethical standard as a prohibited act, some courts
have held that violation of a professional ethical standard does constitute
unprofessional conduct. 10 Other courts, however, have declined to uphold
disciplinary action if it was not based on conduct specifically prohibited by
statute."'
IV. JuDiciAL RECOGNITION OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION'S CODE OF
ETHics, PHYsicIANs' FmucIARY DUTIES, AND POWER DYNAmCs
In light of the problems inherent in physician-patient sexual contact,"1
2
modern public policy should strongly favor a prohibition against all phy-
sician-patient sexual contact regardless of the patient's consent. This pro-
hibition involves recognition of three important factors: the power imbalance
between physician and patient, the medical profession's code of ethics, and
the fiduciary nature of the professional relationship. All three factors suggest
an affirmative right of the public and individual patients to be able to rely
on physicians to refrain from engaging in sexual relations with their patients.
The medical profession clearly recognizes these three significant issues.
The fiduciary nature of the professional relationship serves as part of the
to, minimal standards of care of similar practitioners under the same or similar circumstances,
whether or not actual injury to a patient is established . . ."). Ohio also incorporated the
medical profession's code of ethics into its statutes. See supra note 103 (discussing
§ 4731.22(B)(18)(a)).
108. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 334.100(2)(4)(i) (1989 & Supp. 1992) (providing that "[e]xercising
influence within a physician-patient relationship for purposes of engaging a patient in sexual
activity" constitutes "misconduct, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty, unethical conduct or
unprofessional conduct," for which medical board can impose discipline); WASH. R v. CODE
§ 18.130.180(24) (1991) (providing that "abuse of a client or patient or sexual contact with a
client or patient" constitutes "unprofessional conduct").
109. See ALASKA STAT. § 08.64.326(a)(9) (1962 & Supp. 1992) (providing that state medical
board can impose disciplinary sanction on physician fdr engaging in "lewd or immoral conduct
in connection with the delivery of professional services to patients"); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 18.130.180(1) (1991) (providing that "commission of any act involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty, or corruption relating to the practice of the person's profession" constitutes
"unprofessional conduct"). In Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Board, the Washington Supreme
Court found that this particular statute was rendered more specific by reference to purposes
of professional discipline, and common knowledge and understanding of members of a
particular profession. Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1074 (Wash. 1991).
In Haley, the medical board disciplined a physician for engaging in sexual contact with a
patient; however, the board relied on § 18.130.180(1) rather than on § 18.130.180(24), which
specifically prohibits physician-patient sexual contact. Id. at 1075.
110. See infra notes 155-91 and accompanying text (discussing how professional ethical
standards are incorporated into statutory standards by courts).
111. See infra notes 123-54 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts
refused to uphold disciplinary action based on violation of professional ethical standard unless
conduct was specifically prohibited in statute).
112. See supra notes 18-47 and accompanying text (describing problems with sexual
relationships between physicians and patients and reasons for prohibition).
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foundation for the medical profession's prohibition against physician-patient
sexual contact.1 1 3 The medical profession's recognition of the disparity in
power between physician and patient provides a further basis for the medical
profession's active stance against physician-patient sexual contact.'
1 4
The extent to which the states recognize power imbalancei fiduciary
duty and the medical profession's ethical standards varies. The various
degrees to which state legislatures recognize the medical profession's stan-
dards is reflected by the way in which states incorporate or refuse to
incorporate the medical profession's code of ethics into the state statutes ."
5
Some legislatures have also acknowledged the considerable difference in
power between physicians and patients,"16 and the vulnerability of the
patient."
7
Judicial recognition of the three factors seems to vary from state to
state."' Courts generally recognize that a fiduciary relationship exists "where
113. See BLAcKMAN & BA=LEY, supra note 25, at 52 (discussing fiduciary nature of
physician-patient relationship); supra note 25 and accompanying text (same).
114. See AMA Report, supra note 4, at 2742 (discussing combination of physicians'
knowledge, expertise, and status with patients' physical and emotional vulnerability). The
AMA explained that these elements of the physician-patient relationship combine to give the
physician disproportionate influence over the patient. Id. Due to the relative power position
of the patient within the professional relationship, the patient is unable to give reliable or true
consent to sexual contact with the physician. Id.
115. See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (discussing states' incorporation of
medical profession's code of ethics).
116. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(1)0) (West 1992) (stating that physician's exercise of
influence within patient-physician relationship for purposes of engaging patient in sexual
activity is grounds for disciplinary action by medical board).
117. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 70, para. 801 (1992) (defining "emotionally dependent" as
nature of patient's or former patient's emotional condition and nature of treatment provided
by physician such that physician knows or has reason to believe that patient or former patient
is unable to withhold consent to sexual contact by physician).
As a result of this inability to give meaningful consent, several state legislatures have
specified that psychiatrists and psychotherapists's cannot use the consent of the patient as a
defense to charges of sexual misconduct. See CoLo. Rav. STAT. § 18-3-405.5(3) (1992) (stating
that consent by client to sexual penetration, intrusion, or contact shall not constitute defense
to sexual contact by psychotherapist); MiNN. STAT. Am. § 609.344(1)(h-j) (1992) (stating that
consent by patient is not defense to sexual contact by psychotherapist when penetration
occurred during psychotherapy session, when patient or former patient is emotionally dependent
upon psychotherapist, or when sexual penetration occurred by means of therapeutic deception
by psychotherapist).
The degree to which states disallow the consent defense also varies. Some statutes presume
that patients are never capable of giving full and informed consent to sexual contact by their
physicians. See FIA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(1)0) (West 1992) (stating that patient shall be
presumed to be incapable of giving free, full, and informed consent to sexual activity with
physician); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 801 (1992) (stating that consent of patient or former
patient is irrelevant to determining whether prohibited sexual contact by physician occurred).
Other states narrow the prohibition of the consent defense to certain situations. See MNN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.344(1)(k) (1992) (prohibiting patient consent defense when sexual penetration
is accomplished by means of false representation by health care professional that penetration
is for bona fide medical purpose).
118. See irfra notes 119-91 and accompanying text (observing that courts differ greatly
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there is a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good
conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the interests
of the one reposing the confidence." '" 9 However, when the courts are
evaluating cases involving physician-patient sexual misconduct, they do not
always look to the inherent fiduciary nature of the physician-patient rela-
tionship. Not all courts recognize the existence of a power differential
between physicians and patients. Some courts recognize patients' inability
to give meaningful consent to sexual contact by their physicians, 20 while
other courts reverse board disciplinary actions on the basis of patient consent
to the sexual activity. ' 2' Finally, courts express different opinions regarding
the significance of the medical profession's ethical code.
Public policy, reflected in these three factors, suggests treating physician-
patient sexual contact in a careful, thoughtful manner because the activity
is much different from sexual relations between two consenting adults with
presumptively equal power. Whether courts make use of the medical profes-
sion's ethical code and whether they acknowledge power dynamics and the
fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship often determines how
courts handle cases involving physician-patient sexual contact, especially
how they construe statutes.122
A. Cases That Narrowly Construe the Prohibition Against Physician-
Patient Sexual Contact
Yero v. Department of Professional Regulation'2 and Gromis v. Medical
Board of California'24 exemplify in different ways how some courts deny
the public the benefit of its bargain with the medical profession-the
affirmative right to rely on physicians to execute faithfully their ethical
obligations to refrain from having sexual contact with patients regardless
of consent.'1 In each of these cases, the court failed to regard fully the
medical profession's ethical code, the fiduciary nature of the physician-
patient relationship, and the power differential between the parties.
In Yero v. Department of Professional Regulation, 26 the Florida District
Court of Appeal reversed a disciplinary action imposed by the Board of
regarding recognition of fiduciary aspect and power imbalance in physician-patient relation-
ships).
119. Neagle v. McMullen, 165 N.E. 605, 608 (I1. 1929).
120. See infra notes 155-91 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts
acknowledge patients' inability to give meaningful consent to sexual contact by their physicians).
121. See infra notes 123-54 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts do
not consider patient's inability to consent to be relevant factor).
122. See infra notes 123-91 and accompanying text (contrasting cases in which courts
recognized medical profession's ethical code and unique nature of professional relationship
with cases in which courts did not).
123. 481 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
124. 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452 (Ct. App. 1992).
125. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text (discussing public's "bargain" with
medical profession).
126. Yero v. Department of Professional Regulation, 481 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
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Medical Examiners against a psychiatrist who engaged in sexual activity
with a patient one month after the termination of the professional relation-
ship.' 27 In Yero, after terminating treatment, the psychiatrist "succumbed"
to the demands and threats of his patient, whom he diagnosed as having a
borderline personality structure.'12 The court acknowledged that termination
of the physician-patient relationship prior to the occurrence of sexual
activities with the patient would not necessarily insulate the psychiatrist
from disciplinary action. 29 However, the court found that the psychiatrist's
license could be suspended in only two statutorily-described situations: (1)
if the physician used the physician-patient relationship to engage in sexual
activity, or (2) if the physician exercised influence within the physician-
patient relationship for purposes of engaging the patient in sexual activity.'
30
The court found that no basis existed for the suspension of the psychiatrist's
license because the evidence failed to establish either of these conditions.'
3 '
The Yero court based its test on two Florida statutes that specifically
prohibited physician-patient sexual contact in the two situations described
by the court. 32 However, the court did not consider another statute that
prohibited the failure to practice medicine with the level of care, skill, and
treatment that would be recognized as being acceptable under similar con-
ditions and circumstances by a reasonably prudent physician. 3 The Yero
court could have taken the approach of other jurisdictions by construing
this general prohibition to include the psychiatrist's sexual conduct in this
situation. In fashioning its narrow test, the Yero court considered neither
the fiduciary nature of the professional relationship nor the medical profes-
sion's strict prohibition against sexual relations with patients even after the
termination of treatment.
In determining the standard of conduct to which physicians must adhere,
the California Court of Appeal, in Gromis, 34 employed an even narrower
approach than the Yero court. In Gromis, the court reversed a disciplinary
action imposed by the Medical Board of California, and affirmed by the
trial court, against a physician who engaged in a sexual relationship with a
127. Id. at 63.
128. Id. at 61-62.
129. Id. at 63.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See FLA. STAT. AtN. § 458.329 (West 1993) (prohibiting sexual misconduct in practice
of medicine and defining sexual misconduct to include physician's use of physician-patient
relationship to induce patient to engage in sexual activity); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(l)(k)
(West 1981) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(1)0) (West 1992)) (providing as
ground for disciplinary action physician's exercising influence within patient-physician rela-
tionship for purposes of engaging patient in sexual activity).
133. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.331(1)(t) (West 1992) (providing as ground for disciplinary
action physician's failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment
recognized by reasonably prudent similar physician as acceptable under similar conditions and
circumstances).
134. Gromis v. Medical Bd., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452 (Ct. App. 1992).
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patient concurrent with the physician-patient relationship. 3 Specifically, the
court considered whether the physician violated California Business and
Professional Code section 726, which prohibits a physician from engaging
in sexual relations with a patient if the conduct is "substantially related to
the qualifications, functions, or duties" of the physician. 36
In reviewing the board's disciplinary action, the trial court found that
the physician took advantage of a position of trust and introduced the
sexual relationship into the existing professional relationship, causing injury
to the patient. 37 The trial court concluded that the section 726 "substantially
related to the functions and duties" test was satisfied in this case because
the entire intimate relationship arose out of the physician-patient relation-
ship, and the relationship subsequently caused injury to the patient.'
The California Court of Appeal accepted the trial court's factual
findings, including the finding that the physician took advantage of a
position of trust and the patient suffered injury, but concluded that those
findings were "insufficient to support the legal conclusion that the sexual
relationship had a bearing on the functions and duties of a physician."'3 9
The Court of Appeal explained that no evidence proved that the physician's
status as the patient's doctor actually caused the injury. 4' The Court of
Appeal determined that, in order to uphold the disciplinary action, the trial
court must find that the physician abused his status as the plaintiff's doctor
to induce the patient's consent to sexual activity.'
4'
135. Gromis, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459. Dr. Gromis acted as the patient's primary care
physician and treated the patient for various physical ailments; however, the patient also went
to Gromis to discuss her emotional and marital problems. Id. at 454. Gromis continued to
treat the patient after he initiated a date and during the period in which he had sexual
intercourse with the patient. Id. On at least two occasions, the patient asked Gromis if she
should see another physician, and Gromis advised her that such action was unnecessary. Id.
at 454-55. Gromis explained the ethical implications of their sexual relationship by stating that
"he could treat her for anything above the waist, and she should see another physician for
anything below the waist." Id at 455.7
136. Id. at 454. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 726 (Bancroft-Whitney 1992) states:
"The commission of any act of sexual abuse, misconduct, or relations with a patient, client,
or customer which is substantially related to the qualifications, functions, or duties of the
occupation for which a license was issued constitutes unprofessional conduct and grounds for
disciplinary action. .. ."
137. Gromis, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 458.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. The court acknowledged that the patient suffered injury as a result of the sexual
relationship with her physician, but the court stated that the patient suffered harm simply
because "she had an unhappy affair with a man who happened to be her doctor." Id.
141. Id. at 459. The court further noted that the record was susceptible to contrary
inferences on the point of whether the physician abused his status to induce the patient's
consent. The court stated, "[o]n the one hand, it might be found that Dr. Gromis took
advantage of information gained through his status as Ms. M.'s physician, namely, her marital
problems, and initiated an extra-marital affair. On the other hand, it might be found that the
sexual relations arose from the mutual friendship and affections that formed outside the
office." Id. IHowever, the trial court previously determined that Dr. Gromis took advantage
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In coming to its decision, the Court of Appeal in Gromis relied on an
earlier California case, Atienza v. Taub,142 which considered whether an
allegation that a physician initiated a sexual relationship with his patient
during the time he was treating her stated a cause of action for malpractice.
143
Although Atienza involved a malpractice claim rather than a board disci-
plinary action, the Gromis court found the Atienza court's interpretation
of California Business and Professional Code section 726 to be relevant.
The Atienza court interpreted the language in the statute which prohibited
sexual contact that was "substantially related to the qualifications, function,
or duties" of the physician to mean that the physician's liability turned
solely on whether the sexual relationship was initiated by the physician
under the guise of treatment. 44 The Atienza court came to this extremely
narrow definition by looking at four cases in which courts found a basis
for a malpractice action based on patients' allegations that the physicians
induced sexual relations as part of therapy. 45 The physicians had been held
liable for their actions when they engaged in sexual conduct on the pretext
that it was a necessary part of treatment. 146 From this, the Atienza court
concluded that the only situation in which a physician can be held liable
for sexual relations with a patient is when the physician has engaged in
such conduct under the guise of treatment. 47 The Atienza court explained
that because the physician's actions in that case were not a "modality of
treatment," they were not "substantially related to the qualifications, func-
tion, or duties" of the physician; therefore, the Atienza court concluded
that no breach or violation occurred.1
48
The Gromis court acknowledged two situations in addition to the "under
the guise of treatment" situation described in Atienza in which physician-
of his position of trust in initiating the sexual relationship. Id. at 458. The California Court
of Appeal itself previously held that "when two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced
from the facts, this court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial
court." Shea v. Board of Medical Examiners, 146 Cal. Rptr. 653, 662 (Ct. App. 1978).
142. 239 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Ct. App. 1987).
143. Atienza v. Taub, 239 Cal. Rptr. 454, 456 (Ct. App. 1987).
144. Id.
145. See id. at 456-57 (discussing Waters v. Bourhis, 220 Cal. Rptr. 666 (Cal. 1985);
Cotton v. Kambly, 300 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d
753 (Mo. 1968); Roy v. Hartogs, 381 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1976)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 457. The Atienza court's reading of "substantially related" to mean that § 726
prohibitions come into play only when the sexual contact occurs under the pretext of treatment
is clearly an extremely narrow interpretation of the section. Furthermore, the court's analysis
is suspect; the fact that courts have prohibited certain types of conduct does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that all other types of conduct are permissible. Lastly, the Atienza
court not only disregarded the patient's right to rely on the physician's faithful execution of
his ethical duty to refrain from sexual contact, but it refused to recognize any kind of fiduciary
nature of the physician-patient relationship. To the Atienza court, the patient simply was
complaining that "she had an unhappy affair with a man who happened to be her doctor."
Id.
148. Id. at 457 n.3.
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patient sexual activity should be proscribed: when the physician uses his
status to induce the patient's consent and when the sexual relationship
compromises the physician's medical judgment. 149 However, the Gromis
court explicitly refused to consider the AMA ethical standards and disap-
proved of the trial court's reliance on expert medical testimony based on
AMA ethical standards. 50 In addition, the Court of Appeal in Gromis
criticized the trial court's ruling that a doctor's sexual misbehavior with a
patient would adversely affect the doctor's fitness to practice medicine.1
5'
The Court of Appeal reasoned that this ruling begged the question by not
defining misbehavior.5 2 Although the AMA does define misconduct as any
sexual contact that occurs concurrent with the physician-patient relation-
ship,'53 the Court of Appeal stated that the trial court's reliance on this
blanket prohibition to determine the medical standard of care was incor-
rect. 54 Like the Atienza court, the Gromis court refused to acknowledge
the patient's legal right to rely on the physician's faithful execution of
ethical duties. The court therefore implicitly held that the physician's ethical
duties had no bearing on the legal duty of care.
B. Cases That Consider the Ethical Prohibition and the Fiduciary Aspect
of the Professional Relationship
In contrast to the cases discussed in the previous section, the cases in
this section, Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Board,5 1 Perez v. Missouri State
Board of Registration for the Healing Arts, s6 and Pons v. Ohio State
Medical Board,157 exemplify decisions in which courts recognize that sexual
contact with a patient during the professional relationship, or even after
the termination of the professional relationship, is a clear violation of the
duty of care a physician owes a patient. Haley, Perez, and Pons allow the
public the benefit of its bargain with the medical profession. 8 These
decisions uphold the right of the public and of individual patients to rely
on physicians to execute faithfully their ethical obligations to refrain from
having sexual contact with patients regardless of consent. In each of these
cases, the court, in evaluating the physician's conduct, regarded the medical
149. Gromis v. Medical Bd., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452, 458 (Ct. App. 1992).
150. Id. at 455, 459.
151. Id. at 458.
152. Id. at 459. The court also criticized an outdated version of the AMA rule because
it declared sexual misconduct to be unethical without defining "misconduct." Id. at 455 n.3.
However, it should be noted that the current AMA opinion explicitly defines sexual misconduct
as sexual contact that occurs concurrent with the physician-patient relationship. AMA CURRENr
OPINIONS, supra note 4, at 40.
153. AMA CURRENT OPINIONS, supra note 4, at 40.
154. Gromis v. Medical Bd., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452, 459 (Ct. App. 1992).
155. 818 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1991).
156. 803 S.W.2d 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
157. 614 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1993).
158. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text (discussing public's "bargain" with
medical profession).
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profession's ethical code, the fiduciary nature of the physician-patient
relationship, and the power differential between the parties. Rather than
giving a narrow reading of the statutes, these courts look to physicians'
professional ethical duties and the unique nature of the physician-patient
relationship.
In Haley,'59 the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed a disciplinary
action imposed by the state medical board against a physician who engaged
in sexual activity with a former teenage patient three months after the
termination of the professional relationship. 60 The physician's actions vio-
lated a provision of the state's Medical Disciplinary Board Act, which
broadly prohibited any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corrup-
tion relating to the practice of medicine.'
6'
Just as in the Atienza and Gromis cases, 62 the principal question that
arose in applying the statute in Haley concerned the relationship between.
the practice of the profession and the conduct alleged to be unprofessional. 
63
The Haley court first established that, to serve as grounds for professional
discipline under the statute, the physician's conduct must be "related to"
the practice of medicine.'6 The court then construed the "related to"
requirement to mean that the conduct must indicate unfitness to bear the
responsibilities of, and to enjoy the privileges of, the profession. 65 The
Supreme Court of Washington interpreted the "related to" requirement
much differently than both the Atienza court, which narrowly read the
"substantially related to" requirement to mean under the guise of treatment,
and the Gromis court, which read the statutory requirement to mean conduct
affecting the physician's treatment of the patient. '6
The Haley court asserted that conduct that may constitute unprofessional
conduct under the statute need not directly relate to specific skills needed
159. Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1991).
160. Id. at 1066.
161. See id. at 1068 (citing WAsH. REv. CODE § 18.130.180(1) (1991)). Revised Code of
Washington § 18.130.180(1) provides that for any person under the jurisdiction of the uniform
disciplinary act, "[tihe commission of any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or
corruption relating to the practice of the person's profession" constitutes unprofessional
conduct. WASH. REv. CODa § 18.130.180(1) (1991). The state medical board in Haley found
that the physician also violated § 18.130.180(24) of the Revised Code of Washington, which
provides that sexual contact with a patient constitutes professional misconduct. Haley, 818
P.2d at 1066. However, the Supreme Court of Washington disagreed with the board's
application of this statutory provision because the patient in this case was not a current patient.
Id. at 1067-68.
162. See supra notes 134-54 and accompanying text (describing how California Court of
Appeal in Atienza v. Taub and Gromis v. Medical Board of California interpreted "substantially
related to" requirement of statute in reviewing board discipline of physicians).
163. Haley, 818 P.2d at 1068.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 134-54 and accompanying text (describing how California Court of
Appeal in Atienza v. Taub and Gromis v. Medical Board of California construed "substantially
related to" requirement of statute).
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for practice, and need not occur during the actual exercise of professional
skills. 167 According to the Haley court's interpretation of the statute, conduct
may indicate unfitness to practice medicine if it raises reasonable concerns
that the individual may abuse the status of being a physician in such a way
as to harm members of the public, or if it lowers the standing of the
medical profession in the public's eyes. 16
Applying its interpretation of the statute, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington concluded that the board's finding that the doctor's relationship with
the former patient constituted exploitation of the patient for sexual grati-
fication was sufficient to conclude that the physician's conduct constituted
unprofessional conduct under the statute. 169 In addition to finding that the
doctor's status as physician served as the basis for the initiation of the
sexual relationship, and that the doctor used the trust and confidence he
had achieved when serving as the patient's physician in order to establish
the sexual relationship, the court concluded that the physician's conduct
indicated unfitness to practice in two ways. First, his actions raised concerns
about his propensity to abuse his professional position. Second, his actions
tended to harm the standing of the profession in the eyes of the public.
The court found that both of these results lead to reasonable apprehension
about the public welfare. 70 Unlike Yero, Atienza, and Gromis, the Haley
court looked to public expectations that physicians will execute their ethical
duties, 171 and recognized the psychological power and authority physicians
have over their patients solely by virtue of the physicians' relative power-
fulness within the physician-patient relationship. 72
In Perez,'" the Missouri Court of Appeals evaluated a statute that
broadly prohibited a physician from "engaging in dishonorable, unethical
or unprofessional conduct of a character likely to deceive, defraud or harm
167. Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 818 P.2d 1062, 1069 (Wash. 1991). The court
further explained the "majority rule" that disciplinary action may be taken against a physician
because of acts or offenses which are not directly connected with the physician's technical
competence to practice but which only evidence weaknesses of character which are regarded
by the licensing authorities and the courts as "inconsistent with the general standards of the
profession." Id. at 1070 (citing Francis Dougherty, Annotation, Physician's or Other Healer's
Conduct, or Conviction of Offense, Not Directly Related to Medical Practice, as Ground for
Disciplinary Action, 34 A.L.R.4TH 609, 613 (1984)). The court cited as illustrating the majority
rule Windham v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 163 Cal. Rptr. 566 (1980); Erdman v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 261 N.Y.S.2d 634 (App. Div. 1965); In re
Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824 (Wash. 1958); Standow v. Spokane, 564 P.2d 1145 (Wash. 1977).
Haley, 818 P.2d at 1068-70.
168. Hale,, 818 P.2d at 1069.
169. Id. at 1070-71.
170. Id. at 1071.
171. See id. (observing that public expects physician to decline flirtations of adolescent
patient rather than taking them as opportunity for sexual exploitation).
172. See id. at 1070 (stating that physician exercised psychological power and authority
over patient solely by virtue of relationship he had established as patient's surgeon).
173. Perez v. Missouri State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts, 803 S.W.2d 160
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
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the public."'' 74 Like the Haley court, the Perez court held that a physician
violated this statutory prohibition by engaging in a sexual relationship with
a patient.
75
The facts in Perez closely resembled those in Gromis. The Missouri
State.Board of Registration for the Healing Arts disciplined a physician for
engaging in a consensual sexual relationship with a patient concurrent with
the professional relationship. 7 6 However, the Perez court's approach to the
case differed remarkably from the Gromis court's reasoning. Despite a clear
public policy concern about physician-patient sexual contact voiced by the
California legislature in its statutory prohibition against physician-patient
contact,' 7  the Gromis court decided that the statute did not apply to the
physician's conduct because the sexual relationship did not have a "bearing"
on the functions and duties of the physician." 8 The Perez court, on the
other hand, determined that the physician's sexual relationship with a
consenting patient did violate a much more general statutory prohibition
against dishonorable, unethical, or unprofessional conduct. 179
Although the Perez court did not expressly mention the AMA's prohi-
bition against physician-patient sexual contact, the Perez court took the
medical profession's ethical standards into consideration by finding that the
physician's conduct fell below the statutory standard because it was "dis-
honorable, unethical and unprofessional." 8 0 In contrast, the Gromis court
found that professional ethical standards were irrelevant.'8 ' The Missouri
statute's broad language and references to ethics and professionalism allowed
the Perez court to uphold the medical board's disciplinary action. The
different outcomes of the Gromis and Perez cases may be attributed to the
differences in statutory text; however, the deeper problem is the different
attitudes of the courts toward professional self-regulation, which determine
the interpretation that the courts give to statutory language.
174. See id. at 164 (citing Mo. Rv. STAT. § 334.100.1(10) (1978)). Section 334.100.1(10)
provided that the state medical board could undertake disciplinary proceedings against a
physician for "engaging in dishonorable, unethical or unprofessional conduct of a character
likely to deceive, defraud or harm the public." Id.
175. Perez, 803 S.W.2d at 165.
176. Id. at 162-63.
177. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing California statute prohibiting
sexual contact between physicians and patients).
178. See Gromis v. Medical Bd., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 452, 458 (Ct. App. 1992) (explaining
why statute prohibiting physician-patient sexual contact was not applicable to defendant
physician's conduct).
179. See Perez v. Missouri State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts, 803 S.W.2d
160, 164-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (reasoning that physician's sexual relationship with patient
was dishonorable, unethical, and unprofessional conduct likely to harm public, thus constituting
statutorily prohibited conduct).
180. See id. at 165 (finding that physician breached statute because conduct was dishon-
orable, unethical, and unprofessional).
181. See Gromis, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455 n.3 (stating that court need not consider whether
physician violated AMA ethical standards because discipline is based solely on statutory
standards).
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Finally, in Pons,8 2 the Ohio Supreme Court evaluated a board disci-
plinary action in light of an Ohio statute that, like the Missouri statute in
Perez, prohibited physicians from departing from, or failing to conform to,
"minimal standards of care of similar practitioners under the same or
similar circumstances."' ' 8 3 The Pons court also applied another section of
the Ohio code that authorized the state medical board to discipline physicians
for violating ethical standards adopted by national professional organizations
such as the AMA. 184 The Pons court found that the physician had violated
these two statutory prohibitions by engaging in a sexual relationship with a
patient.'
In applying the "minimal standards of care" provision of the statute,
the-Pons court noted that the majority of the board members were licensed
physicians who possessed the specialized knowledge needed to determine the
acceptable standard of general medical practice. 8 6 The court found that a
physician's standard of care extends beyond surgical skills and general
medical knowledge; the care that a doctor renders to a patient consists of
the entire treatment relationship between the doctor and patient. 87 The
court upheld the board's findings that the physician violated the Ohio
statute because he exhibited extremely poor medical judgment and was not
acting in the patient's best interest when he entered into a sexual relationship
with a patient who placed a great deal of trust in him.'88
With regard to the second part of the statute, the prohibition against
violations of professional ethical standards, the Pons court upheld the
board's finding that the physician's sexual relationship with his patient
violated the AMA's Code of Ethics. 18 9 The Ohio Court of Appeals had
previously overturned the board's action, in part because the physician's
activities in this case occurred prior to the AMA's prohibition against
physician-patient sexual contact.190 The Ohio Supreme Court and the medical
182. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 614 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1993).
183. See id. at 751 (citing Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(6) (Baldwin Supp. 1991)).
184. See Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 614 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio 1993) (citing Omo
REv. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(18)(a) (Baldwin Supp. 1991)). Section 4731.22(B) provides:
The board . . . shall, to the extent permitted by law, limit, revoke, or suspend a
certificate, refuse to register or refuse to reinstate an applicant, or reprimand or
place on probation the holder of a certificate for ...
(18)(a) The violation of any provision of a code of ethics of a national
professional organization. "National professional organization" means the American
medical association, the American osteopathic association, the American podiatric
medical association, and such other national professional organizations as are deter-
mined, by rule, by the state medical board....
Id. § 4731.22(B).
185. Pons, 614 N.E.2d at 752.
186. Id. at 751-52.
187. Id. at 751.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 752.
190. In re Pons, No. 91AP-746, 1991 WL 245003, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (explaining
that no sanction specifically tied to sexual activity between patient and physicians was in effect
from 1976 to 1983, when sexual activity occurred in this case).
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board, however, looked to other provisions in the AMA Code of Ethics
that generally required a physician to uphold the dignity and honor of the
medical profession. 9' The court upheld the board's determination that the
physician failed to uphold the dignity and honor of the profession when he
maintained a sexual relationship with his patient and that he had exploited
the patient's trust.
V. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF MEDICAL ETHICS IN PHYSICIAN-PATIENT
CONMDENTALrrY MATTERS
As discussed above, some courts have been reluctant to consider the
medical profession's ethical standards regarding physician-patient sexual
relationships; however, courts have not expressed this reluctance regarding
other aspects of the doctor-patient relationship. In cases involving breaches
of physician-patient confidentiality, courts have been more willing to look
to the physician's ethical and fiduciary duties than in cases involving
physician-patient sexual relations. In breach of confidentiality cases, courts
have increasingly recognized that patients have a right to rely on physicians
to execute their ethical duties so as to protect the confidential relationship.
92
In these confidentiality cases, courts have recognized that the public is aware
of both the medical profession's ethical code provisions and the Hippocratic
Oath, which prohibit a physician's breach of confidentiality. 93 Many courts
have concluded that, based on this widespread public knowledge of the
profession's ethical obligations, the public has a right to rely on those
ethical codes in making private civil claims.
194
Courts' reluctance to consider the ethical and fiduciary aspects of the
physician-patient relationship in cases involving sexual relationships and
their willingness to consider these aspects in confidentiality cases raise some
questions. The reason for the judiciary's inconsistency in applying the
profession's ethical standards to determine proper conduct for physicians
remains unclear. Once the courts have established that the public has a
right to rely on physicians' faithful execution of their ethical obligations, it
would be inconsistent for the courts then to select which particular ethical
obligations will translate into legal obligations.
191. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 614 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio 1993).
192. See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (stating that patients' expectations and trust in physicians arise from fiduciary nature of
relationship and patients' awareness of medical ethics); Petrillo v. Syntex Lab., Inc., 499
N.E.2d 952, 959 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (finding that public has affirmative right to rely on
physicians to execute their ethical duties), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007 (1987); Humphers v.
First Interstate Bank, 684 P.2d 581, 587 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that private cause of
action exists because medical ethical principles are public knowledge and public has right to
rely on these principles), aff'd in part and rev'd in part (on other grounds), 696 P.2d 527
(1985).
193. See Petrillo, 499 N.E.2d at 960 (discussing public awareness of medical ethical code
and Hippocratic Oath).
194. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text (discussing causes of action created
by public knowledge of medical profession's standards).
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Judicial unfamiliarity with the medical profession's 1990 prohibition
against physician-patient sexual contact may provide some insight as to why
not all courts have adopted the medical profession's standard. However, a
deeper cause may exist. Courts hold different views about the role of the
medical profession's ethical codes in society. Some courts entirely dismiss
professional ethical codes, finding that they are inapplicable in a court of
law. 1 s Others find that professional ethical codes give patients and the
public an affirmative legal right to rely on physicians to execute the ethical
obligations set forth in the code. 96 One source of the different views of
state courts regarding the role of medical professional ethics may be the
degree to which states desire to exercise control over the practice of medicine
within their borders.' 97 Although *states traditionally possess the power to
regulate medicine, they must acknowledge the medical profession's standards
in order to insure that the public receives the benefit of its bargain with
the medical profession.19
VI. CONCLUSION
The fundamental anomaly inherent in the current structure of physician
regulation works to the detriment of the general public and individual
patients by depriving them of the benefit of their bargain with the medical
profession. Legal standards of medical care are based on reasonable expec-
tations of patients, which, in large part, are based on the medical profes-
sion's code of ethics.'9 Therefore, the legal standards, as promulgated by
the state legislatures and interpreted by the courts, should reflect the medical
profession's ethical standards. In determining legal standards of medical
care, courts and state legislatures should especially take into account the
medical profession's concerns about the power differential inherent in the
physician-patient relationship and the fiduciary duty owed by physicians to
patients.
One way to achieve an alignment between legal standards of medical
care and the medical profession's rules would be for all state legislatures to
follow the lead of states such as Oregon by providing that violations of
195. See Bryant v. Hilst, 136 F.R.D. 487, 492 (1991) (finding medical code of ethics
inapplicable to issues before court because it is not binding law).
196. See Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 449 N.E.2d 952, 959 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (stating
that ethics of medical profession grant public, specifically patients, affirmative right to rely
on physician to execute faithfully those ethical obligations).
197. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text (discussing traditional power of states
to control and regulate medicine).
198. Cf. Nicole Baer, Court Upholds Ottawa Doctor's Suspension, OTTAWA CrroEN, Apr.
23, 1993, at BI (citing proposition that allowing courts to interfere with professional medical
standards and establish different standards is not consistent with society's views about physician
discipline).
199. See BLACKMAN & BAIEY, supra note 25, at 50 (noting that legal standards of medical
care are based on reasonable expectations of patients, which in turn are based on code of
ethics that physicians have set for themselves).
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professional ethical standards constitute misconduct. In this way, the medical
profession could regulate its members according to its own rules with the
states' authority supporting it, rather than competing with it. However, as
the cases discussed above exemplify, courts are free to interpret statutory
language in a variety of ways. Thus, even if all state legislatures adopted
the medical profession's ethical standards, particular courts could engage in
a restrictive reading and thereby defeat the purpose of the profession's
standards. When reviewing medical board disciplinary actions, the judiciary
itself needs to give adequate weight to the prohibition of physician-patient
sexual relationships.
Courts' recognition of the medical profession's prohibition would allow
the public and individual patients to rely on physicians' faithful execution
of all of their ethical duties, rather than just a particular few. Regardless
of the particular ethical duty in question, courts' review of board disciplinary
actions should reflect the public's right to rely on physicians to fulfill their
ethical obligations. It is not enough for legislatures to codify the public's
right to rely on physicians' ethical behavior. Courts must not read the
statutes so restrictively that the purpose of the statutes is defeated. Judicial
recognition of physicians' ethical obligations would provide well-defined
standards by which to evaluate physicians' conduct. A lack of well-defined
standards retards enforcement.? Equally important, enforcement without
adequate standards produces injustice. 201
TANYA J. DOBASH
200. DE.BYSnRE, supra note 10, at 86.
201. Id.
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